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Toward a relational ethic
Kenneth ]. Gergen

Introduction
Several years ago I was having lunch with a philosopher friend, and described
to her some of my theoretical work in social construction. The work focused
on the way in which people together geq_erate interpretations of what is
real, rational, and good. As I explained, such ideas have been inspiring to
many people, because they remove the rational grounds for any authority whether secular or sacred - to dictate or determine what is true or good for
all. A space is thus opened for the expression of all opinions. Yet, as I waxed
enthusiastically about the implications of these views for science, education,
and daily life, my companion grew quik When I paused for her reflections,
I was met with a glowering silence. Finally, with clenched teeth, she let me
know that she could no longer remain at the table with me. Dumbstruck,
I pleaded to know the source of her' irritation. As she explained, she had
relatives who had died in the Holocaust, and the ideas I expressed offered
no means of resisting Nazi atrocities. For constructionists, she reasoned,
there was no commitment to an ethic that could stand in the way of such
evil. This was intolerable.
We did work our way slowly through the entanglements of logic in such
a way that we could complete the meal in relatively good terms. However,
the experience was a powerful one, and its rev~rberations have continued
to the present - now finding expression in the present offering. As I have
now come to see it, we were caught that day within a tension of centuries'
duration, reaching its zenith in the late 20th century. One might say we were
still toiling with the outcome of the Enlightenment, in which the forces of
reason and observation were set against religious beliefs. In the early 20th
century, this tension emerged as the struggle between a secular and largely
materialistic orientation to life and deep investments in spirituality, human
values, and traditions of the sacred. As the century grew on, the Enlightenment echoes could be located in various forms of pluralism as against various efforts to sustain foundational values on the other side. 1
Such dialogues continue, but now with a new and far more sinister
edge. In my view, the emerging plethora of globe-spanning technologies of
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communication has radically intensified our differences. We have reached
the point today at which values and beliefs have leaped from their geographical boundaries and are everywhere in conflict. Jet transportation enables one to relocate to virtually any other corner of the earth in less than
24 hours. By virtue of the W:orld Wide Web, one may locate the like-minded
in any geographical location, near or far. With email, one may remain in
close contact with any acquaintance, no matter where they are. With smartphones we may instantly be in contact textually, auditorily, and visually.
The result is that anyone seeking security in a tradition of value or belief can
potentially locate around-the-clock support throughout the world. Communities of belief may thus engage in continuous reinforcement of their views,
strengthening, intensifying, and expanding. With this solidification, all that
is outside the wall of belief becomes alien, a potential threat. My luncheon
colleague argued passionately, but hers is only one of myriad passions. As
convictions spread and intensify, so the world becomes more deadly..
Paradoxically, however, these technologies that intensify a world of conflict also lend themselv~s to the deterioration of moral relevance. For large
segments of Western culture, they undermine commitments to any belief or
value whatsoever. Everywhere, individuals and organizations make strong
claims to the moral high ground - in religion, politics, gender, race, and so
on. All too often, such claims result in the demeaning, oppression, imprisonment, or murder of massive numbers of people. For those witnessing these
effects, strong, passionate, or foundational claims to the good seem increasingly dangerous. Indeed, an inflexible cbmmitment to any moral value seems
childish or primitive. 2
More problematically, a resistance to fundamentalism also lends itself to
moral indifference. 3 Righteous claims to the good pose a danger. And if
every group can make claims to 'the good' in its own terms, then no one's
claims have commanding force - this includes the claims of government, the
law, the church, one's.parents, and so on. Thus "whatever I declare as good,
is as legitimate as any other." Indeed, why should one bother inquiring into
the good at all? Just live life"b--as it comes, fulfill yourself, and don't bother
with the rest. This is a world in which public lying, embezzlement, profiteering, fraud, intimidation, money laundering, tax evasion, and the like are not
particularly shameful. The only significant problem is getting caught. Such
views - often equated with moral relativism -find little resistance in the culture. There are no strong arguments against them, save those of yet another
foundationalist enclave. Because of their alliance with the Enlightenment,
and their need to remain non-partisan, our schools offer few resources for
moral deliberation. Slowly, the resources for an ethical consciousness are
bled from society.
We thus enter a period of history in which value commitments are moving in diametrically opposing ways. On the one hand, such commitments
are moving toward an intense and globally threatening pitch; in stark contrast, in many enclaves of the world, value commitments are ceasing to be
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regarded or relevant. How are we thus to proceed? We cannot easily fall
back on any of the traditional religions for an answer, because their very
claims to moral authority contribute to the situation at hand. Nor can we
in the West dip into the repository of ethical positions - from Aristotelian
virtues, Kantian imperatives, or human capabilities - to sustain a universal
imperative. All are byproducts of Western culture, and thus suspicious for
those outside that culture. And, on what grounds could they establish moral
authority? Whose tradition would j_ustify these grounds? More directly relevant to world conditions are ethical positions that favor generalized love or
care for others - for example, a feminist ethics of care (Tronto, 2005), or a
Levinasian entreaty to attend to "the face of the other" (Levinas, 2005). But
even here we are left with enormous ambiguities in how an ethic of care for
the other would play out if 'the other' wishes to restrict education to males,
abandon a two-state solution, expel immigrants, or segregate the races.
In what follows, I will open a space for an alternative orientation to ethics, one that could blunt the attempts to impose ethics that would silence
all others, but that could simultaneously reldhdle a concern with ethical
deliberation. More precisely, I wish to generate an ethical standpoint that
honors all visions of what is good or moral in human activity. At the same
time, I will make no foundational claims for this meta-ethical standpoint. As
ungrounded grounds, the proposal functioqs not so much as an imperative
but rather as an invitation. Where will this take us? How would it benefit
humankind or life on the planet more generally? What are we asked to
sacrifice? The invitation to deliberation is inclusive. Yet, I do not view such
delibera,tions as primarily conceptual in nature. The challenge here is not
conceptual justification or a scholarly adventure into abstraction. Rather,
the attempt is to explore the ethical implications in ongoing action. This
means that neither a foundational commitment nor a relativistic insouciance
will allow escape. The challenge lies in the way in which our actions play
out together from moment to moment.
To explore what I shall call- a relational ethic, I will first consider the
origins of all moral orientations. This will invite an appreciation of the multiple and conflicting visions of the good now circulating the globe. It will
also illuminate the closely related 'sources of evil.' This discussion sets the
stage for considering the significance of relational process in giving rise to all
moral orientations. Valuing this source of value thus serves as a meta-ethic.
I then take up four domains of action that may ground the more abstract
logic of relational ethics. This will allow us to confront the twin challenges
of foundationalism and relativism.

The relational origins of good and evil4
The range of what humans have come to value/over the centuries is virtually
boundless - from the love of gods, community, country, love, self-realization,
and equality, on the more sweeping side; to family, gun ownership, privacy,
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and football on the more specific. One might even find values deeply insinuated into every movement of the day - from the hour of arising, to the choice
of what one eats, to whom one speaks, to each of the websites visited as one
traverses cyberspace. To be sure, we find many speculations about universal
goods - for example, peace; benevolence, freedom, or sensual pleasure. But
for any value that one identifies in such efforts, there are people in various
conditions who will find war more desirable than peace, self-satisfaction
more appealing than benevolence, control more helpful than promoting
freedom, and asceticism more fulfilling than sensual pleasure. One is drawn,
then, to the ineluctable conclusion that moral values are specific to various
cultures or subcultures in various times and specific places.
Such a conclusion is no small matter because it reveals what may be
viewed as the primary source of values: human relationships. Whether any
activity is a good in itself - possessing intrinsic value - remains conjectural.
However, there is virtually no activity that some people at some time have
not resisted. The valu~ of an activity does not emerge, then, from the activity in itself, but from the meaning it acquires in human interchange. 5 In this
sense, values acquire their meaning in the same way as language: participation in a social process. Virtually all relationships will generate at least
rudimentary understandings of 'what is good for us.' They are essential to
sustaining patterns of coordination. It should not be surprising, then, that
the term ethics is derived from the Greek, ethos, or essentially, the customs
of the people; or that the term morality draws from the Latin root, mos, or
mores, thus equating morality with custom. Our constructions of reality
walk hand in hand with our logics, and our moralities.
Let us view this movement from rudimentary coordination to value formation in terms of first-order morality. To function within any viable relationship will virtually require embracing, with or without articulation, the
values inherent in its patterns. When I teach a class of students, for example,
first-order morality is at work. We establish and perpetuate what has become
the 'good for us.' There are no articulated rules in this case, no moral injunctions, no bill of rights for itudents and teachers. The rules are all implicit,
but they touch virtually everything we do, from the tone and pitch of my
voice, my posture, and the direction of my gaze to the intervals during which
students may talk, the loudness of their voice, and the movement of lips, legs,
feet, and hands. One false move and any of us becomes the target of scorn.
In effect, morality of the first order is essentially being sensible within a way
of life. 6 In the same vein, most people do not deliberate about murdering
their best friend, not because of some principle to which they were exposed
in their early years, and not because it is illegal. It is virtually unthinkable.
Similarly, it would be unthinkable to break out in a tap dance at a holy mass,
or to destroy a colleague's laboratory. To be sure, such ways of life may be
solidified in our laws, sanctified by our religions, celebrated in our moral
deliberations, and intensively articulated in ethical theory. We live our lives
largely within the comfortable houses of first-order morality.
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It is at this point that we also join hands with writings on moral or value
pluralism. As often attributed to Isaiah Berlin (1991), we recognize the possibility of a range of fundamentally different, incommensurable, and potentially conflicting traditions of morality. And, while pluralist writings are often
equated with political liberalism - standing against fascism or absolutism of
any·kind - less is said about 'origins of evil.' But consider: whenever people
come into coordination, first-order morality is in the making. As we strive
to find mutually satisfactory ways of going on together, we begin to establish a local good, "the way we do it." Simultaneously, the emergence of 'the
good' creates an alternative of the less than good. A range of actions are now
featured as off limits, or forbidden - a door behind which lies mystery. All
children know the joy of breaking the rules, whispering in class, laughing at
a prank, stealing a cookie. And what is forbidden always invites the curiosity
of "what if.... " Further, there is rebellion against the tyranny of the enforcer.
"Why can't I ... ?" "Who says I can't ... ?" "I don't take orders from you."
The potential for immorality is furthered by the fact that most cultural
traditions carry multiple values, variously impcfrtant or emphasized depending on context. We place a value on working hard, and on playing; on freedom, and on responsibility; on obedience, and on disobedience; on fitting in,
and on being unique; on pleasing others, and on autonomy; and so on. Thus
the stage is set for choosing the good, and simultaneously being scorned or
punished for being bad. One should care f9r one's family, but may be jailed
for stealing to fill their needs; women should have the right to abort, but be
ostracized for doing so; a president should not lie, but will be protected by
his colleagues if the lie enhances the power of their party. 'Bad actions' may
always seem to be a 'good idea at the moment.' And, of course, we now
confront the clashes of civilizations, as deeply entrenched traditions of the
good come face to face, often finding a threatening evil in the other.

Relational process: the ethical invitation
As I am proposing, as people coordinate their actions, creating a way of
life that will optimally be harmonious and nourishing, they are laying the
groundwork for what we call moral action. In this sense, moral action is
always under production, whether unstated and little regarded, or articulated and staunchly defended. This also leaves us with the following paradox:
the very production of first-order moralities als9 establishes the conditions
for immorality. But whatever is immoral for one may be valued by another.
In this sense, conflicting goods will always be with us. The challenge is not
to achieve a conflict-free existence, but to locate ways of approaching conflict that do not bend toward mutual extermination. Given the challenge of
moral apathy, are there means of inspiring moral engagement without the
demands of singular commitment?
1
It is just here that we can return to the original source of moral commitment, and indeed, meaning of any kind: coordinated action. The value
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of harmonious relationships is scarcely new to ethical inquiry. However,
almost invariably the ethic has restated on a fundamental assumption of
separation. The ethically informed person acts toward others in a way that
harmony will ensue: "I do unto others," "I am compassionate toward others," "I am caring for others," and so on. By focusing on the emergence of
human meaning, we shift 1£rom this traditional concern with individuals to
the more fundamental process of relating. Out of this process, the very idea
of individuals is created. Human communication is essentially the outcome
of coordination among persons. Like language, moral leanings are not the
product of any single person. They depend on relational process. Without
this process, we have no religion, science, political institutions, commerce,
education, or organizations. There is nothing to care about or live for - big
or small. Regardless of tradition - existing or in the making - the positive
potentials of this process are vital. If we all draw life from this process, then
it demands our collective attention. Here we may speak of what should be a
universal concern, the1 grounding for a relational ethic.
Now consider the consequences of the paradoxical relation between
'good and evil.' Most typically, challenges to a moral order are met with
resistance. As children we are encouraged to 'be good' through rewards,
and our failures are met with irritation, lectures, correction, penalties, anp
physical punishment. In each case, a space of alienation emerges between
the parties. Then there are the more heinous actions - robbery, extortion,
rape, drug dealing, or murder. It is here we find a dangerous transformation in the quest for the good. In the case of these more threatening actions,
an impulse toward elimination is often unleashed. This is typically accomplished through various forms of defense (surveillance, policing), curtailment (imprisonment, torture), or, more radically, through extermination
(death penalty, invasion, bombs). This shift from alienation to elimination
can be accompanied by a sense of deep virtue.
As we shift from alienation to elimination, we also undermine the potentials of positive coordination. Placed in jeopardy is the process of coordination, from which reality;"rationality, and a sense of the good is derived.
As the eliminative impulse is set in motion, and we move toward mutual
annihilation, we approach the end of meaning. It is precisely here that a
relational ethic becomes imperative. Required is participation in a process
that can restore, sustain, and strengthen the possibility of morality making.
In the embrace of a relational ethic, we sustain the possibility of morality
of any kind.
From the standpoint of a relational ethic, there are no individual acts of
evil, for the meaning of all action is derived from relationship. Holding individuals responsible for untoward actions not only is misguided but results
in alienation and retaliation. In the case of a relational ethic, individual
responsibility is replaced by relational responsibility, or a responsibility for
sustaining the potential for positive coordination (McNamee & Gergen,
1999). To be responsible to relationships is to devote attention and effort to
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means of sustaining the potential for co-creating meaning. When the wheels
of individual responsibility are set in motion, relationships typically go off
track. Blame is followed by excuses and counterblame. In being responsible
for relationships, we step outside this tradition, and care for the relationship becomes primary. In relational responsibility we avoid the narcissism
implicit in ethical calls for 'care of the self' and as well, the self-negation
resulting from the imperative to 'care for the other.'
One may argue that this proposal for a relational ethic simply reconstitutes the problems inherent in foundational ethics. Is this not equivalent to
declaring that people ought to be responsible for the process of sustaining
coordinated relationships? If so, is this not another hierarchy of the good in
which the irresponsible are deemed inferior and in need of correction? Such
a critique presumes, however, that lying beneath a relational ethic is some
kind of moral authority, a bedrock on which it is established. There is no
such foundation. The logics put forward here are themselves issuing from
traditions of the good, no less socially constructed than all others. To be
sure, the account provides a form of meta-dhic, but in the end it can only
invite participation. It is not an authoritative pronouncement, but an invitation to re-coordination.

Relational ethics in practice
Thus far the proposal for a relational ethic is abstract and minimally explicated. Further development is needed, and this development should itself
reflect the participation of many voices. To invite such discussion, what follows is an exploration of critical dimensions of ethical action. It is one thing
to lay out a rationale for a meta-ethic, but what kind of actions would realize its implications? What is it to 'act ethically' from a relational standpoint?
While this question may seem transparent enough, preliminary attention is
required. As we shall see, the traditional relationship between ethical theory
and practice - with abstract formulations dictating action - is problematic.
Simultaneously thrown into critical relief is the coqcept of moral agency.
The philosophy of ethics has primarily been an exercise in language.
Inquiries into 'what is the good' are exercises in discourse, with a reasoned
account of ideal consciousness as the goal. An ethically informed consciousness should provide the grounds for ethical action. Yet, there is a major
problem inhering in these attempts, one that threatens their relevance to
cultural life. This is the challenge of deduction: how one is to derive from
a general category of the good - or an ethical consciousness:- a set of particular actions. The ideal category of the good provides no rules as to what
counts as an instantiation. If one seeks to be kind, compassionate, tolerant,
or appreciative, for example, what precisely is entailed in the way of action?
What does one say, with what tone of voice;' with what direction of one's
gaze, and with what posture or movements ~f the arms and hands? We may
all agree that it is good to 'love one another,' but what it means to love
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in terms of concrete actions varies dramatically - from a simple smile, to
restricting a child's behavior, to smothering another in kisses, or smothering
them with a pillow.
The relational account developed here adds a further level of complexity. One's actions in th~mselves do not count as kind, compassionate, or
loving, for example. One's actions come into these meanings depending on
the coordinated action of others. If one's self-considered action is 'compassionate,' and another reacts to it as 'condescension,' then it ceases for
the moment to be compassion. Attention thus shifts from the traditional
assumption of the 'moral agent' who engages in 'moral action' to morally
rich processes of relating.
It is here that Wittgenstein's landmark work, Philosophical Investigations, is of special significance. Placed in question by this work is the traditional view of language as a picture of the world. By abandoning this
view, the problem of deduction is also eliminated. If our accounts of love,
compassion, care, and so on are not pictures of the world, then there is
no problem of del:lucing what counts as instantiations of these accounts.
In Wittgenstein's outline of a use-based account of language, our attention
shifts to the pragmatic uses of ethical languages in ongoing social life. Ethical philosophy, cut away from 'contexts of application,' runs the risk of
irrelevance. The most sophisticated theories of the good may undermine
their potential through their very sophistication.
Thus, in what follows, I wish to explore four domains of ethical action
from a relational standpoint. In each case, I attempt to wed conceptual ideals to practices of relationship.
Caring communication

If the primary value is placed on processes of relating that foster, sustain,
and enrich the process of relating itself, then major attention shifts to our
practices of communication. What forms of communication can achieve
these ends? How can 'Me relate with each other in ways that care for the
relationship itself? When there is shared agreement on a way of life, common, civil communication may itself nourish relationship. The simple participation in a traditional way of life together symbolically honors 'our way.'
To chat lightly with Emily, the cashier at the local grocery store, may seem
a trivial event, but it is the kind of glue that holds the community together.
At the same time, there is a sustained tendency toward fragmentation in
any culture, with those sharing tradition drawing together in separation
from others. On university campuses, for example, communication within
departments of study far eclipses communication across departments. In
corporations, there are separations in terms not only of management levels, but of the functions served (e.g., operations, marketing, R&D). Wherever people organize - in government, religion, hospitals, schools, and so
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on - there are tendencies toward separation. In effect, there may be care
within various enclaves, but relations among them are threatened.
It is here that we may appreciate the ethical implications of far-reaching
efforts to enhance collaborative practices. In universities, there is increasing reliance on collaborative research; in technology labs is now the major
source of creativity; in classrooms collaborative projects are now common
forms of teaching; many therapists now see their relationship with clients
as a collaboration; in healthcare there is a shift toward collaboration across
specialties, with the patient now included as part of the team; military topdown structures of command and control are giving way to linking collaborating teams; and in business, the practice the need for collaborative
leadership is increasingly realized. To this we must add international collaborations to combat global warming, protect wildlife habitats, control
the spread of diseases, coordinate air traffic, and much more. As practices
of collaboration become,instilled into the routines of daily life, we embody
a relational ethic. For more on relevant practices of dialogue and collaboration, see Skeie (Chapter 10 in this volume), van Nileijl (Chapter 11 in this
volume), and M. Gergen (Chapter 12 in this volume).

Conscience: responsible to all
One might take a dim view of relational ethics c;m the grounds that it stands
for so little in itself. Where are the hard questions of the world - questions
of human rights, the rise of fascism, racism, and so on? To be sure, nothing
within a relational ethic provides a foundation for voicing either support or
resistance in such cases. At the same time, however, there are no foundational arguments against voicing preferences in any such cases. This is not
for a lack of what might be called 'conscience' within the relational orientation. On the contrary, a relational ethic calls for an overflowing conscience.
That is, to champion relational process is to treat with respect the intelligibility of all participants, even when other views are disagreeable. It is to
carry the voices of all value orientations, to respect their validity within the
circumstances in which those values were created. Every voice of value, no
matter how heinous to others, carries the assumption of its own good. To
be relationally responsible is to defend the rights of all to make themselves
intelligible. One may surely resist what is seen as 'evil action,' but with
a sense of humility -with respect to both one's own lack of fundamental
grounds and the realization that, under identical circumstances, a similar
choice could have been made.
What would this expanded form of conscience mean in action? It would
favor, for example, supporting movements for social justice, for minority
rights, or against tyranny of any kind, but without pathologizing those who
might be targets of such movements. It would be to1support those who speak
out against sexual harassment, but respecting the possibility of alternative
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intelligibilities. In many cases, a relational ethic would lend support to the
expression of multiple goods. Thousands are escaping the bloodshed and
poverty in their home countries and seeking entry - often illegal - into other
lands. The legal voice is relevant to such conditions, but it should function
as only one voice among many. Here it is important that multiple expressions be set in motion, including those of the immigrants, citizen enclaves,
economists, religious figures, educators, and so on.
Creativity: confiuence in motion

A relational ethic is an. ethic of improvisation and innovation. It is an ethic
of improvisation because the daily challenge of sustaining harmonious relations with others requires continuous agility. At base, every conversation is
a novel event. The words that are spoken, the way they are spoken, and the
context in which they occur are always new. This means that all utterances
harbor a certain ambiguity;
one's interlocutors may shift the direction of
I
their meaning in many ways. What seems to be a compliment may be construed by its recipient as a subtle criticism, a way of currying favor, a means
of demonstrating superiority, an act of kindness, or something else altogether. And responses to this seeming compliment may also be construed
in many ways. Whether the pair emerges from the conversation as cari'ng
companions or alienated acquaintances depends on coordination in improvisational skills.
A relational ethic also favors innovative action. This is so because all traditions of the good are limited in their forms of action. One may be taught
from an early age that 'giving to the poor' is commendable. One may thus
be drawn by the plight of the beggar on the street, and feel pangs of guilt
in hurriedly passing by. It would not occur to one in this tradition that giving is an evil. And yet, for inner city workers attempting to reduce drug
dependency, this i_s a warranted conclusion. Food and shelter are available
to the homeless, it is argued. Money that is begged is likely to maintain a
drug habit. The point here is especially important in terms of attempts to
bridge contrasting moral traditions. If traditions are limited in their forms
of action, then bridging work requires innovation - the creation of forms of
action that may invite participation from differing traditions but be new to
all. This is particularly relevant in the context of the global clash of moral
traditions and the ensuing bloodshed. What Alma (Chapter 4 in this volume) calls a moral imagination is required. We may thus applaud the work
of various groups - in peace building, community building, interreligious
dialogue, mediation, witnessing, repatriation, and the like - attempting to
create new forms of dialogue. Rather than settle for the "natural ways we
talk with each other," they consciously set out to create new forms of. interchange for building or restoring viable relations. Such efforts should not be
limited to grassroots organizations, as they often are, but should also be
shared by major institutions of business and government. Especially related
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to issues of leadership, see also ter Avest (Chapter 5 in this volume) and van
Loon and Buster (Chapter 6 in this volume).
Continuation: process over outcome
There is a strong tradition in Western culture to seek decisive conclusions.
It is within this tradition that truth, as a singular and universal account of
the world, has had a prevailing sway. And it is within this context that the
discourses of principles, certainty, clarity, resolution, resolve, grounding,
outcomes, solutions, and scores have played a contributing role. All such
discourse lends itself to final fixing, certain knowledge - ensuring a 'last
word.' From a relational standpoint, a last word is no word at all, as its
meaning will not be revealed until others coordinate with it in some way.
A last word is the end of conversation, the end of communication, and thus
the end of meaning. From a relational standpoint, then, the action focus is
not on ultimate outcomes, but in the continuing conversation.
Here the work of Catholic theologian David"'l"Tracy is illuminating. As
Tracy (1987) points out, there is a strong tendency in the major religious
traditions to fix the nature of God, good and evil, the nature of human
beings, the universe, and so on. Religious texts such as the Bible or the
Qur'an are often used in this way. As Tracy argues, however, such texts
always permit multiple interpretations. Not only are the texts inherently
ambiguous, but the differing assumptions, values, visions, and so on that
the reader brings to the text will permit or invite different interpretations.
For Tracy, this is not a failing, but an invitation to increase the richness of
the text. Thus, the readings of texts within various traditions "are different
construals of Ultimate Reality itself" (Tracy, 1987, p. 90). For Tracy this is a
clarion call to interfaith dialogue, as multiple construals add enriching laminations to our understanding and to the potentials for spiritual life (Tracy,
1991). For Tracy, engaging in such qialogue is itself a spiritual action. Also
see Ipgrave (Chapter 8 in this volume) for a discussion of the significance of
plural interpretation.
It is in this context that a relational ethic places a premium on the continuous process of relating. Issues of moral import should not be solved,
thus permitting participants to retire with a sense of righteous satisfaction. Rather, recognizing the ambiguity inherent in such decisions, and the
potential for multiple standpoints, there should be no principled end to
the conversation. In terms of action, such a logic· favors mediation over
the structure of contention within the legal system. In the classroom, it also
favors dialogic pedagogy with an emphasis on multiplicity in interpretation.
Examinations and testing of students should be replaced by more relational
processes that enlist multiple voices in an atmosphere of mutual respect.
If properly conducted, it favors town meetings, 1and community-wide projects. In such practices we do not apply a relational ethic; we embody it in
practice.
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Beyond conclusions
My attempt in this offering has been to find a means of pressing toward an
ethical form of life that would avoid the way in which competing ethical
positions invite extremist int9lerance and bloodshed on the one hand, and a
moral lethargy on the other. The hope is that by bringing into focus the very
origins of moral action, we might locate a process that could be embraced
by all traditions. As proposed, moral action and ethical reasoning emerge
within relational process. Thus, it is the life-giving potential within this relational process that must be placed in the forefront of concern. As also reasoned, ethical theory should not proceed, cut apart from the forms of life
that might give it meaning. Thus, discussion was opened on various forms
of action coherent with proposal for a relational basis of moral action.
To be sure, many issues remain unexamined in this treatment. It may first
be apparent that in explicating a relational ethic, most of the discussions in
the domains of practice concerned the challenge of moral or ethical conflict;
how to bring people together, sustain dialogue, collaborate, and so on. Little
was said about the twin problem of pluralism, namely a lethargic relativism.
What does a relational ethic offer to those who simply shrug their shoulders
in the face of moral issues? It is cavalier to suppose that, even if introduced
into our educational systems, the reasoning offered here for a relational
ethic would invite a transformation in ethical sensitivity. But, as advanced
earlier, ethics in the abstract are little more than language games. The challenge is to embed the abstractions within forms of cultural life. In my view,
the beginning of ethical consciousness lies, then, in participation in ethically
relevant forms of life.
Most children learn at an early age not to lie, cheat, or steal, and for most,
the lessons are sustained for a lifetime. Very few, however, would be able
to provide an in-depth rationale for why these are unethical acts. Thus, in
confronting the issuf; of moral lethargy, the primary emphasis may properly
be placed on instituting forms of activity that privilege positive relational
process. In education, as poi1ited out, pedagogies of collaboration are highly
consistent with a relational ethic. Dialogic classroom practices can foster
mutual understanding and tolerance, along with an appreciation for the creative outcomes of working together in groups. Much the same may be said
of the increasing prominence of project learning, in which students work
collaboratively toward a goal. Testing and grading practices generally work
against generative relationships. They invite alienation and distrust among
students, between students and teachers, and between students and their
families. There is great advantage in replacing traditional assessment with
practices of evaluation built into dialogic and collaborative processes, along
with shared reflection on learning process (Gergen & Gill, forthcoming). In
this case we build moral muscle not through declarations of the good, but
through ethically informed practice.
A second significant silence in the present account concerns cases of illegal and/or onerous action. Consider here, for example, acts of pedophilia,
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murder, or terrorism. While illegal and detestable, the actor can offer arguments for their intelligibility. Now, much of the earlier discussion in this
chapter presumed the possibility of interchange - the bridges for communication could be built between otherwise disagreeing parties. Mutual understanding and transformation might result. In the cases of actions of deep
repugnance, such bridges would seem impossible. While one might come
to understand why these acts were intelligible, they would still be roundly
condemned, and incarceration enthusiastically endorsed. At the same time,
such a conclusion would lead us into a cul de sac; it would suggest that a
relational ethic is just fine until it isn't. Can we extend the ethic, then, to
include cases of deep repugnance? Again, continuing discussion is needed;
but again, we gain some purchase by considering realms of practice. The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, healing the wounds
of apartheid, is exemplary. The increasing numbers of restorative justice
programs also point in a promising direction. And a relational ethic would
entail abandoning the death penalty.
Yet, while opening a space for an over"ifrching ethical orientation, the
present attempt is scarcely complete. It cannot be complete in principle,
because if the attempt is itself coherent with the ethic it espouses, it is essential to sustain multiparty deliberation. One might say that the proposal is
for an ever-emerging theory and practice. The present account is but the
beginning of a conversation.

Notes
1 See also Taylor (2007) on the rise of the secular age.
2 See also Stout (1988) on the failure of foundationalism and its contribution to
moral malaise.
3 A resistance to religious foundationalism is scarcely the result of multiple and
competing claims. The general drift of the West toward secularism, often traced to
the period of the Enlightenment, is clearly relevant (cf. Taylor 2007). Many hold
that the secularist drift is now prevailing globally. As Bullard (2017) reports in
National Geographic, the "world's newest great religion is no religion."
4 A preparatory note: Concepts of 'the good,' the 'inoral,' and the 'ethical' are
closely bound. In my view, the sense of 'good' functions as a primitive (we may
find it 'good' to have peace and quiet); when the sense of good is codified or
articulated we speak of it as 'morality' (it is a moral good that we don't disrupt
others' wellbeing, for example, by playing loud music); and when we provide a
conceptual account of why such morality is imperative, we enter the field of ethics.
5 The remainder of this discussion draws from Gergen (2007, 2009).
6 Also see McIntyre's (2007) discussion of the way in which these ways of life are
realized in individual identity and responsibility.
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